We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann [3]). In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in...

We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in...

We study competitive equilibrium in sequential economies under limited commitment. Default induces permanent exclusion from financial markets and endogenously determined solvency constraints prevent debt repudiation. Our analysis shows that such an enforcement mechanism is essentially fragile,...

In this paper, we consider economies with (possibly endogenous) solvency constraints under uncertainty. Constrained ine±ciency corresponds to a feasible redistribution yielding a welfare improvement beginning from ev- ery contingency reached by the economy. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10])...

This paper investigates the relation between risk and the degree of financial intermediation in a model with moral hazard. Entrepreneurs can simultaneously get credit from two type of competing institutions:"financial intermediairies" and "local lenders". The former are competitive firms issuing...

We present a simple comparative statics analysis of steady-state equilibria in overlapping generations economies with capital accumulation. We regard comparative statics as paradoxical whenever an exogenous increase in saving propensity induces a decrease (an increase) in consumption at the...