We introduce learning in a principal-agent model of stochastic output sharing under moral hazard. Without knowing the agents' preferences and technology the principal tries to learn the optimal agency contract. We implement two learning paradigms - social (learning from others) and individual...

We introduce learning in a principal-agent model of output sharing under moral hazard. We use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) and individual evolutionary learning (IEL) to represent individual learning. Learning in...

We use maximum likelihood techniques to distinguish across models of international capital flows using a comprehensive dataset on GDP, capital stocks, consumption, investment, employment, and net exports (used to measure capital flows) for 200 countries between 1950 and 2005. Specifically, we...

This paper examines whether financial constraints affect firms’ investment decisions for older (larger) firms. We compare a group of unbanked firms to firms that rely on formal financing. Specifically, we combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry...

We formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of information-constrained credit markets that allow for moral hazard and unobservable investment. We compare them to the exogenously incomplete markets environments of autarky, saving only, and borrowing and lending in a single asset. We use...

We analyze the role of commitment in a dynamic principal-agent model of optimal insurance with hidden effort and observable but non-contractible assets. We argue that the optimal contract under full commitment is time-inconsistent. Consequently, we solve for and analyze the optimal insurance...