We study the optimal design of a social security system when individuals differ in health status and occupation. The health status is private information but is imperfectly correlated with occupation: individuals in harsh occupations have a higher probability of being in poor health. We explore...

Advances in information technology have improved the administrative feasibility of redis- tribution based on lifetime earnings recorded at the time of retirement. We study optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy in which redistributive taxation and social insurance...

This paper analyses the political constraints of intergenerational risk sharing. The rst result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex ante optimal insurance. The second result is that in a second best political setting PAYG still contributes to intergenerational risk...

This paper explores the optimal risk sharing arrangement between generations in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth.We allow for nonseparable preferences, paying particular attention to the risk aversion of the old as well as overall "life-cycle" risk aversion.We provide a...

This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, the paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is...

Although the optimal public policy under an endogenous number of children has been widely studied, the optimal public intervention under an endogenous timing of births has remained largely unexplored. This paper examines the optimal family policy when the timing of births is chosen by...

This is a postprint of a paper that was published in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146, 1990, pp. 640-647

This is a postprint of a paper that was published 1997 in H. Giersch (Ed.) Reforming the Welfare State. Berlin: Springer-Verlag

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals’ welfare by altering how yielding to temptation...

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e....