Ellsberg's experiment involved a gamble with no ambiguity (N) and a gamble where the prize that could be won is objectively known, but the winning probability depends on the (ambiguous) urn's composition (P). We extend this by including a gamble where the winning probability is objectively...

We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of...

Epstein (2009) describes three Ellsberg-style thought experiments and argues that they pose difficulties for the smooth ambiguity model of decision making under uncertainty developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).  We revisit these thought exeperiments and find, to the contrary,...

This paper surveys some economic applications of the decision theoretic framework pioneered by David Schmeidler. We have organized the discussion around three themes: financial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. The first section discusses papers that have contributed to a better...

Are foundations of models of ambiguity-sensitive preferences too flawed to be usefully applied to economic models?  Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) say such is indeed the case.  In this paper, first, we point out that many of the key arguments by Al-Najjar and Weinstein do not apply to quite a...

We propose and axiomatize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker evaluates acts according to the expectation (over a set of probability measures) of an increasing transformation of an act`s expected utility. This expectation is calculated using a subjective probability...

Dow and Welang (1994) extended the notion of Nash equilibrium for two-player finite normal games when players are uncertainty on the behavior of his opponents. They showed the existence of equilibrium for any given degree of uncertainty however constant over all possible events, except the null...

We propose and axiomatize a new model of preferences that achieves a separation between ambiguity, identified as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective information, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes.

We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on...

Following the ideas of Bohr, Von Neumann, and Benioff, we formulate quantum decision theory (QDT) as the quantum-mechanical theory of measurement for probability operators. QDT captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions. It is based on the...