This dissertation examines the delegation of monetary policy through optimal central banker contracts and the effects of central bank behavior on fiscal policy discipline in a monetary union. First, we examine whether central banker contracts are an optimal form of monetary policy delegation...

Using a new methodology that allows nonlinearities, we find frequent support for external debt sustainability in a number of Latin American countries. Our findings reverse the results for several countries, obtained with traditional unit-root tests and present a richer framework for evaluating...

Approaching monetary policy as a principal-agent problem provides a useful framework for interpreting alternative delegation schemes. In this paper, we consider the effectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when the principal delegates monetary policy through contracts but remains...

"This volume focuses on current issues of debate in the area of modern macroeconomics and money, written from (a broadly interpreted) post Keynesian perspective. The papers connect with Philip Arestis' contributions to macroeconomics and money, and pay tribute to his distinguished...