We show that, under asymmetric information about costs, limit location strategies, that is distortions in pre-entry locations created by the entrant's inference about the incumbent's cost advantage which prevent entry, emerge not only as the result of the incumbent's cost advantage but also as...

We investigate the behavior of a polluting monopolist whose production causes a global damage affecting consumers and non-consumers alike while consumption causes a specific damage affecting consumers only. The monopolist anticipates strategically how her decisions on product variant, price and...

We show that information asymmetry may not cause any distortion in product differentiation. This contrasts with the main result of the literature on signaling which stresses that information asymmetry has a non negligible impact on strategic behavior. A thorough analysis of the...

How does asymmetric information (regarding production costs) in a spatial market alter the behavior of the incumbent firm which can credibly commit to her location choice? Although entry deterrence is irrelevant here, our analysis shows that entry blockading behavior emerges not only as the...

[eng] Spatial competition and distortuns of localization. Under incomplete information. . We study a model of spatial duopoly competition with sequential entry on a segment in the choice of locations (stage 1 of the game) and then simultaneous competition in delivery prices (stage 2). The second...

The general interest would require that the use of major equipments be priced at their marginal cost, including all opportunity costs such as congestion and pollution costs. At least, prices should be lowered until full utilization of these equipments is obtained. This is a result that...

In this document, we present the notion of a cost game, defined as a cooperative game where the gain from cooperation is the cost reduction obtained when the projects of a set of agents are realized in a coordinated way. The problem is then to decide how this gain will be shared among agents or...