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Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians tend to be preferable for tasks that have the following features:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005664399
This paper provides an explanation of the simultaneous occurrence of large accumulation of external debt, private capital outflow and relatively low domestic capital formation in developing countries. We consider a general equilibrium model in which two types of government with conflicting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718544
This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort, or if there is great uncertainty about whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241405
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This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections. Government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors. If different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168197
This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549941
This paper explains the simultaneous occurrence of large external debts, private capital outflows and low domestic capital formation. We consider a general equilibrium model in which two government types with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office. Uncertainty over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549949
This paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections. Government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors. If different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550086