We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed...

In the model of group identification, Samet and Schmeidler (J Econ Theory 110:213–233, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2003</CitationRef>) provide two axiomatic characterizations of the“liberal” decision rule (a person is socially qualified as a member of a collective if and only if he qualifies himself). They impose standard...</citationref>

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are...</citationref>