predict collusion. The paper demonstrates that allowing collusion may be optimal if the principal cannot commit to an …

(1995), into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that … there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation. …

This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing in combating collusion within organizations, or in regulatory … directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they … have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative …

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous … transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory …

We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. We assume that the "supervisor" and the …" between the supervisor and the agent. However, asymmetric information between these two parties can cause a "collusion failure … manipulate the opportunity cost of collusion under this organizational form. The increase in the principal's rent extraction does …

This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)'s results … that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk … neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion based on a trade-off between the risk premia required by (less extreme) risk …

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous … transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory …

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous … transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory …

We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous … transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory …

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation … may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the … contract must be a sales contract if the principal's renegotiation position will be inherently inferior in the sense that (a …