In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in...

We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders. On one hand, the pooling of information within bidding rings increases the precision of competing estimates. We demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more...

This paper aims at analysing the effects of learning on the individual behaviour in an experiment that requires cooperation and coordination within teams. Using artificial agents, different social contests are created, as training environments. The results confirm previous findings (on the...

This article reports not only theoretical solution of bargaining problem as used by game theoreticians but also an adequate calculus. By adequate calculus we understand an algorithm that can lead us to the result within reasonable timetable using either the computing power of nowadays computers...

We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses...

This paper provides an evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination games with auction. A set- valued solution concept is defined for a finite population model under the best response evolutionary dynamics and applied to their games. It is...

Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the...

I continue the study, begun in Blume (1993), of stochastic strategy revision processes in large player populations where the range of interaction between players is small. Each player interacts directly with only a finite set of neighbors, but any two players indirectly interact through a finite...

The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori,...

This research develops a theory about the role of inequality in the overtaking of growth performance across countries. The theory captures two opposing effects of inequality on factor accumulation and suggests that the qualitative change in their combined effect is a prime cause of overtaking....