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We extend the results of Mas-Colell (1980) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost share equilibria with the core. We allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. We show the two welfare theorems for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561001
We discuss the emerging field of New Classical economics from the perspective of some classical economic questions regarding the generation of wealth. We limit our discussion to the foundations of the emerging field and do not provide a complete overview of the details of the literature. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977459
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In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596815
In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation can be represented as part of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our modeling can shed some light on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008541300
We present a general equilibrium model that encompasses the endogenous selection and shadow-pricing of a set of tradeable commodities, with home-based and social production activities. In the model, a "market system" is a set of costly social institutions which embody the trade and production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124764
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We consider an economy with non-Samuelsonian public goods and we focus on linear cost sharing. In a linear cost sharing equilibrium all agents in the economy optimize given a certain fixed cost share to be contributed towards the provision of public goods in the economy. Hence, each agent pays a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147168
In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573060