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polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325211
extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256717
polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335203
This paper reviews and develops a theoretical and empirical representation of economic incentives for the implementation of pollution control strategies. A number of alternative available economic instruments may be thought of which, if applied internationally, could encourage implementation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015228710
The main goal of this paper is to present a different perspective than the more `traditional' approaches to study solutions for games with externalities. We provide a direct sum decomposition for the vector space of these games and use the basic representation theory of the symmetric group to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249801
Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905124
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905386
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indfferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multi-valued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005587079
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762743
This article proposes a methodology to attack the problem of considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long term results for bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763124