) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain …, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We … report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … well, and we demonstrate the usage of this method for the hospitals resident problem with couples. This problem is relevant … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). …

allocations. In this paper we apply this solution concept for the Hospitals Residents problem with Couples (HRC). This is one of … the most important general stable matching problems due to its relevant applications, also wellknown to be NP-hard. We … show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns outto be integral then it provides a stable matching …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …