This paper analyses the monetary policy transmission mechanisms through the banking sector. Banks are assumed to compete a la Bertrand in a loan market characterized by adverse selection. Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) set-up is extended to introduce leakages of reserves from the banking system,...

This paper extends Stahl (1988) by modelling a sequential price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers’s default. If this revenue is non-monotonie with the asking price, theWalrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing...

Four cases of a selection problem are examined where knowledge of the distributions from which project returns are drawn is private to entrepreneurs with projects. Diagrammatic analysis is used to determine the contract form offered by funding banks which choose between debt, equity or a more...

This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

We use a duopoly to show how the possibility of licensing ex post R&D affects the decision on R&D organization. We show that whether licensing ex post R&D affects the incentive for doing cooperative R&D depends on the nature of cooperative R&D. If the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid...