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Traditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest peri-odically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in-the-money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005691750
Why is the issuer's reservation price not disclosed in bookbuilding? We analyze the differential effect of reservation price disclosure on the underpricing required to elicit truthful indications of interest from investors. We find that a policy of disclosure would increase proceeds for firms...
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Cross-border mergers allow firms to alter the level of protection they provide to their investors, because target firms usually import the corporate governance system of the acquiring company by law. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005204121
A well-known numerical lattice model, widely used to value employee stock options (ESOs), can be interpreted as a variation on the up-and-out protected barrier call, a version of which is valued in closed form by Carr (1995). We clarify that valuation formula and extend it to take account of the...
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We model a competitive industry where managers choose quantities and costs to maximize a combination of firm profits and private benefits from expropriation. Expropriation is possible because of corporate governance 'slack' permitted by the government. We show that corporate governance slack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854022
We model a competitive industry where managers choose quantities and costs to maximize a combination of firm profits and benefits from expropriation. Expropriation is possible because of corporate governance 'slack' permitted by the government. We show that corporate governance slack induces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008864692
We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect of a uniform price restriction on the proceeds of an IPO. If regular institutional investors are, on average, at least as well informed as ordinary retail investors then our corrected version of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630091