We consider interactive epistemic models where individuals are described by both their "knowledge" and their "beliefs." Three intersubjective consistency conditions are examined: Intersubjective Caution (if an individual believes something to be common belief then he knows it to be common...

In this paper we study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative doxastic model of beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated...

This text provides an introduction to the analysis of economic decisions under uncertainty, with particular focus on insurance markets. "The Economics of Uncertainty and Insurance" is relatively short (220 pages) and richly illustrated with 80 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as...

Johan van Benthem has highlighted in his work that many questions arising in the analysis of strategic interaction call for logical and computational analysis. These questions lead to both formal and conceptually illuminating answers, in that they contribute to clarifying some of the underlying...

In (5) a solution concept for extensive-form games was introduced, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In (6) the notion of PBE...

This is a draft of the first half of an open access textbook on game theory. I hope to complete the entire book by the end of 2015. After teaching game theory (at both the undergraduate and graduate level) at the University of California, Davis for 25 years, I decided to organize all my teaching...