Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing...

Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing...

This paper suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts and investigates the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture. Firstly, it incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...

This paper suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts and investigates the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture. Firstly, it incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...

Tenancy has been a means for labor to advance their socio-economic condition in agriculture yet in Brazil and Latin America, tenancy rates are low compared to the U.S. and the OECD countries. We test for the importance of insecure property rights in Brazil on the reluctance of landowners to rent...

This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts. First, it specifies type and importance of...

This paper suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts and investigates the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture. Firstly, it incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

How can a manager influence workers' activity while knowing little about it? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for each...