We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to...

Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information. We provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent...

The decentralization of decision-making is analyzed when agents may have information that is incomplete and possibly exclusive. Theorems provide conditions under which there exists a mechanism whose Bayesian equilibria coincide with a desired collection of social choice functions. The first...

This paper examines natural restrictions mechanisms. If all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition, then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies. This result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features. In part...

The authors consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. They characterize the set of allocation rules that are compatible with individual incentives or, in other words, the set of strategy-proof...

An economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset, and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets. It is a well-known paradox that if agents are price-takers and prices are fully revealing, then...