Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf (absolute and relative) power measures and their interpretations are analysed. Both of them could be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time both of them can be interpreted as probabilities of some decisive position (pivot, swing)...

We formulate a voting model for a legislature composed of many disjoint and cohesive subgroups and we define a power index for a cabinet which is nominated by this legislature. Each subgroup has a leader, and its cohesiveness is measured by the probability that a member votes the same way as the...

In the paper, the consequences of using double majority voting in the European Council of Ministers are analysed. An equivalent single majority distribution of seats is proposed and evaluated.

Assessing the voting power of a decision maker depends on the appropriate evaluation of all factors influencing such power. Models constructed with the use of a set of given factors are usually statistically significant, but at the same time the determination coefficient is very low. An...