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LABOUR TURNOVER AND THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT: EFFICIENCY WAGE V.S FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT.

MACLEOD, B.W.; MALCOMSON, J.M. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350814

Contracts Bargaining for Flows of Goods and Services in Finite Terms.

Macleod, B.W.; Malcomson, J.M. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353515

Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games.

MacLeod, B.W.; Bergin, J. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729565

Les contracts auto-executoires et la theorie des institutions du marche du travail.

MacLeod, B.W. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729587

WAGE PREMIUMS AND THE PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS.

MACLEOD, W.B.; MALCOMSON, J.M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545574

INVESTMENTS, HOLD UP AND THE REFORM OF MARKET CONTRACTS.

MACLEOD, W.B.; MALCOMSON, J.M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353059

Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games.

MacLeod, B.W.; Bergin, J. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729747

Les contracts auto-executoires et la theorie des institutions du marche du travail.

MacLeod, B.W. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353293

EFFICIENT SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, AND THE ROLE OF MARKET ALTERNATIVES.

MACLEOD, W.B.; MALCOMSON, J.M. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775448

Motivation and markets

MacLeod, W.B.; Malcomson, J.M. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997

Many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance, yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it. This paper incorporates such pay, with the following results. Performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401160