We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and obligarchy. We model a two-sector small open …

We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open …

probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly to the elite, highly unequal cocieties are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …

unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly for the elite, highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …

Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such … therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy. …