Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 25,446
Cover Image
Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems
Kovac, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008
reversibility option on the coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper ecient coordination, and we determine … (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the (ir)reversibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086646
Cover Image
Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
Kováč, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 298-320
anticipate strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has … important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049901
Cover Image
Contagion through learning
Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700119
Cover Image
Contagion through learning
Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 4
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730968
Cover Image
Contagion through learning
Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599409
Cover Image
Coordination and policy traps
Angeletos, George-Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, … - 2005
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266286
Cover Image
Information dynamics and equilibrium multiplicity in global games of regime change
Angeletos, George-Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, … - 2004
Global games of regime change that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266305
Cover Image
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
Pavan, Alessandro; Angeletos, George-Marios - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 3, pp. 883-938
Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599503
Cover Image
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - 2012
Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352850
Cover Image
Dynamic global games of regime change: Learning, multiplicity, and timing of attacks
Angeletos, George-Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, … - 2006
Global games of regime change-coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it-have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282901