I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...

This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not increase in structural complexity as consumers are added to the economy, the minimum dimension of data needed to compute...

The N-firm Cournot model with general technologies is reviewed to derive generalized and unified conditions for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Tight conditions are formulated alternatively (i) in terms of concavity of two-sided transforms of inverse demand, or (ii) as linear...

This note demonstrates that a lattice game with strategic substitutes is dominancesolvable if and only if there exists a unique fixed point of the function that results from an iteration of the best response function. This finding complements a result of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990) by...

Coordination failures are very important in imperfect markets, because of related concept of multiple equilibria. This article attempts to explore this topic using tools to overcome the limitations of traditional analytical apparatus, which imposes stringent conditions about functions and...

I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski's fixed-point theorem, and of a much-used extension of Tarski's fixed-point theorem to set- valued maps.

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with...

This paper focuses on the existence of a Cournot equilibrium in a n- firm Cournot market for a single homogeneous commodity. Using a simple argument and proof, it shows that a Cournot equilibrium exists if each firm's marginal revenue declines with its own output and some weak non-decreasing...

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...