We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principal, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility...

We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle,...

This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two mechanisms. The first one, which requires...

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with...