This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in...

This paper considers the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by some sort of random stable mechanism, such as that discussed in Roth and Vande Vate (1990). A one period game is studied in which all stable matchings can be achieved as equilibria; in a natural class...

In a study of alternating offer bargaining with discounting, perfect equilibrium was found to have little predictive power under the conventional assumption that bargainers' utility is measured by their monetary payoffs. Instead, the authors' data exhibit a first mover advantage, independent of...

The histories of seven regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom are considered. Like the American market, these markets have experienced failures that led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms. Because different regions employ different centralized...

This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literatrue. These new derivations clarify the relationshps among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers...

Laboratory data from bargaining experiments have started a debate about the prospects for various parts of game theory as descriptive theories of observable behavior and about whether, to what extent, and how a successful descriptive theory must take into account peoples' perceptions of...

This paper concerns the difficulties associated with establishing a time at which a market will operate. The authors first describe the experience of several dozen markets and submarkets, from entry-level professional labor markets in the United States, Canada, England, and Japan to the...

The potential transactions evaluated in labor markets before equilibrium is identified involve rejected offers. After an initial phase in which many offers can be made simultaneously, a new offer cannot be made until an outstanding offer is rejected, so even a small time required to process...