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Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - 2006

nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312539

Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome

Sabourian, Hamid - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990b) consider a simple decentralized market in which agents either meet randomly or choose their partners volunatarily and bargain over the terms on which they are willing to trade. Intuition suggests that if there are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559

Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point

Torstensson, Pär - 2005

modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESS) by modelling strategies as automata. Payoff and complexity considerations are … taken in the automata-selection process. We show that a MESS exists in the bargaining game and that agreement is reached …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208492

Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point

Torstensson, Pär - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645202

Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

Chatterjee, Kalyan; Sabourian, Hamid - Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance … - 1998

We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the a justification for stationary equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter. As is well-known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005807967

In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept

Volij, Oscar - Oscar Volij - 1998

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in the complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357973

Inducing a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Public Goods Games.

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Fatas, Enrique; Guillen, Pablo - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2006

, baseline and automata. Both consisted of a finitely repeated public goods game with a surprise restart. In the automata … treatment it was announced that there might be automata playing a grim trigger strategy. This announcement became a self …-fulfilling prophecy. That is, most participants actually followed a grim trigger strategy in the automata treatment resulting on an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163450

Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2014

We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721

Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly

Schipper, Burkhard - 2005

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366551

Overconfidence and managers' responsibility hoarding

Nieken, Petra; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zhou, Nannan - 2011

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571367