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Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281986
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324705
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499936
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497722
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005393350
See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257365
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006826221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006157651
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015170
Multi-license ascending auctions have been criticized because they allow bidders to reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, it has been argued that the ascending auction is a suitable format for a seller who wants to exploit preemptive motives. Incumbent firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090871