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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585562
We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623027
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249409
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599400
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515727
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112753
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708590
The paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics, introduced by Matsui and Matsuyama (JET 1995) and further developed by Hofbauer and Sorger (JET 1999, IGTR 2002) and Oyama (JET 2002). A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010626446