This work analyses the effect of the two preference voting systems – proportional system with blocked lists of candidates vs proportional system with open list of candidates - on the quality of politicians. The exogenous variation in the Italian Parliament electoral system (Law n. 270/2005) -...

This work analyses the effect of the two preference voting systems - proportional system with blocked lists of candidates vs proportional system with open list of candidates - on the quality of politicians. The exogenous variation in the Italian Parliament electoral system (Law n. 270/2005) -...

We perform an experiment where subjects pay for the right to participate in a shareholder vote. We find that experimental subjects are willing to pay a significant premium for the voting right even though there should be no such premium in our setup under full rationality. Private benefits from...

Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Republicans do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians stick to the manifesto of their party. The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenonthat does not assume politicians or voters to be...

Evidently, the benefit-structure of the unemployment insurance has a significant influence onprofits and trade union utility. We show for a wage bargaining model that a stronger earningsrelationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages and increase employment. Thisraises the question as to...

Political corruption is a concern of many modern democracies. It weakens democraticinstitutions, restricts public services, and lowers productivity undermining economicdevelopment. Yet despite its importance, our understanding of what determines corruption islimited. This paper uses a novel...