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The calculation and simulation of the price of anarchy for network formation games
Lichter, Shaun; Griffin, Christopher; Friesz, Terry - In: Networks and spatial economics : a journal of … 23 (2023) 3, pp. 581-610
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335162
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Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks
Amelkin, Victor; Venkatesh, Santosh S.; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 217 (2024), pp. 1-38
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015067230
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Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks
Amelkin, Victor; Venkatesh, Santosh S.; Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013206233
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Exploring the relationship between simulation model accuracy and complexity
Robinson, Stewart - In: Journal of the Operational Research Society 74 (2023) 9, pp. 1992-2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014336435
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Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
Hausken, Kjell - In: International game theory review 23 (2021) 2, pp. 1-26
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649667
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Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics
Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Equilibrium <i>(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)</i></li> <li>Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics <i>(Sergiu Hart and Andreu …><b><i>Uncoupled Dynamics:</i></b> <ul> <li>Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium <i>(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas …-Colell)</i></li> <li>Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium <i>(Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)</i></li> <li …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156379
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ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS
Hart, Sergiu - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …
AbstractWe exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206382
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GENERAL PROCEDURES LEADING TO CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA
Cahn, Amotz - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …
AbstractHart and Mas-Colell (2000) show that if all players play “regret matching” strategies, i.e., they play with probabilities proportional to the regrets, then the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria, and the regrets of every player converge to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206392
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HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF UNCOUPLED EQUILIBRIUM PROCEDURES
Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …
equilibrium. We then show that, in contrast, the communication complexity of reaching a correlated equilibrium is polynomial in …AbstractWe study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each … player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206487
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NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS
Hart, Sergiu - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …
presented below, followed by a discussion of dynamic aspects of equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206644