This paper reports a laboratory experiment to study pricing and advertising behavior in a market with costly buyer search. Sellers simultaneously post prices and decide whether or not to incur an exogenous cost to advertise their price. Sellers are not capacity constrained, and each buyer...

In this laboratory experiment sellers simultaneously post prices and choose whether to advertise. Buyers then decide whether to buy from a seller whose advertisement they have received, or engage in costly sequential search to obtain price quotes from other sellers. In the unique symmetric...

This dissertation comprises of 3 essays that analyze the firm pricing behavior in duopolistic experimental markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affect firms' market power. We construct laboratory markets based on a costly...

We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost...

We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost...

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with...