The problem in which some agents joint together to realize a set of projects and must decide how to share its cost may be seen as a cooperative cost game. In many instances, total cost may naturally be decomposed into joint costs and costs that are specific to individual agents. We show that the...

Consider a small developing economy with a manufacturing sector opened to international trade, and an agricultural sector having limited, not to say any, access to world markets. We modify the Grossman and Helpman's influence-driven model of trade policy formation to allow for an endogenously...

This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio on the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of "distribution factors". The latter are defined as...

La disponibilité des ressources hydroélectriques et le cadre institutionnel entourant leur développement ont donné lieu à des prix d'électricité qui sont beaucoup plus faibles au Québec que dans les régions voisines. La structure de cette industrie est en train de changer dans...

This paper develops a model where two agents in different sectors face uncorrelated income risks and mutually self-insure. We discuss how the rent arising from risk pooling modifies the wage distribution in the sector where the employer behaves as a monopsonist.

L'objet de ce papier est d'analyser les conséquences de la mise en place d'une Union économique entre les pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest (UEMOA), dans le cadre d'un modèle d'équilibre général calculable multi-pays avec mobilité des facteurs de production. On s'interroge sur les facteurs de...

Models used for natural resources prices usually preclude the possibility of large changes (jumps) resulting from discrete, unexpected events. To test for the presence of jumps and ARCH effects, we propose to use bounds and bootstrap test techniques, thus solving the unidentified nuisance...