We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending

After the speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates in Europe and in Mexico, economists began to develop models of currency crises with multiple solutions. In these models, a currency crisis occurs when the economy suddenly jumps from one solution to another. This paper...

In the 1990s, currency crises in Europe, Mexico, and Asia have drawn worldwide attention to speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates and have prompted researchers to undertake new theoretical and empirical analysis of these events. This paper provides some perspective on this...

Traditionally the choice of exchange rate regime has been seen as a second-best policy choice, which can be directed toward mitigating the distortionary effects of price or information rigidities. In this paradigm the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility is found to depend of the source...

We develop a simple framework for studying the joint distribution of banking and currency crises triggered by real shocks. Our framework illustrates the fact that bank and currency collapses are related but they are not the same thing. Studying currency and bank collapses either in isolation or...

This paper interprets contagion effects as an increase in the volatility of aggregate shocks impinging on the domestic economy. The implications of this approach are analyzed in a model with two types of credit market imperfections: domestic banks borrow at a premium on world capital markets,...

This paper compares the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries. Overall, empirical results support precautionary motives; in particular, a more liberal capital account regime increases international reserves....