The effects of endogenous undiversifiable investment and market structure changes on security pricing are analyzed within the GEI-CAPM (General Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets Capital Asset Pricing Model). Both the mutual fund and security market line theorems are extended conditional to a...

Price discrimination and rationing of low price customers can often be observed (viz. flight and theater tickets, sales of branded goods). We construct a monopoly model to explain this phenomenon. A firm has the option to charge a high price on a 'day 1', and a low price on a 'day 2', and ration...

It is an old ida in game theory that the justification of Nash equilibrium as a prediction of actual play in a game is that each player by imagining himself in the positions of his opponents will be able to figure out what these other players will play, and consequently the player himself will...

The development accounting literature almost always assumes a Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function. However, if in reality the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor deviates substantially from 1, the assumption is invalid, potentially casting doubt on the commonly held view that...

Policy studies often evaluate health for a population by summing the individuals’ health as measured by a scale that is ordinal or that depends on risk attitudes. We develop a method using a different type of preferences, called preference intensity or cardinal preferences, to construct scales...

We present some simple utility functions whose Marshallian demand functions possess the Giffen property: at some price-wealth pairs, the demand for a good marginally increases in response to an increase in its own price. The utility functions satisfy standard preference properties throughout the...

We formulate an evolutionary learning process with trembles for static games of incomplete information. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time supporting the notion of Bayesian equilibrium....

A democratic society is considered where the voters, but not the politicians, are uncertain about how the economy works. The parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters. Will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient? It turns out...

A matching and bargaining model in a market for a single good with one seller and two different buyers is analyzed under the assumption that resale is possible (buying the good does not necessarily mean consuming it). It is known that the model without resale has inefficient equilibria in which...