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Bargaining and Reputation : An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioral Types

Embrey, Matthew - 2014

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The … experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are …. Overall, the results suggest that the Abreu and Gul (2000) model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067332

Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

Efficiency, communication and honesty

Demichelis, Stefano; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2006

We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162

A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

Josephson, Jens - 2001

In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281359

Coordination with independent private values: Why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of always pass on the left and always pass on the right are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352832

Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case

Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - 2005

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261668

Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory

Joosten, Reinoud - 2009

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all nearby trajectories...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267162

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - 2000

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317649

The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction

Houba, Harold; van der Laan, Dinard; Veldhuizen, Dirk - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325775

Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests

Possajennikov, Alex - 2016

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688533