Similar Search Results

Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

knowledge public knowledge. The experiment replicates the results of earlier experimental studies (Dickhaut et al., 1995, Cai … other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback : theory and experimental evidence

Ertac, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425

Strategic communication: An experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

´s knowledge public knowledge. The experiment replicates the results of earlier experimental studies (Dickhaut et al., 1995, Cai … other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369309

Strategic Communication: An Experimental Investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

's knowledge public knowledge. The experiment replicates the results of earlier experimental studies (Dickhaut et al., 1995, Cai … other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884477

Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193

Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap-talk refinement, neologism-proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215363

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Transparency is overrated : communicating in a coordination game with private information

Cabrales, Antonio; Drouvelis, Michalis; Gurguc, Zeynep; … - 2017

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761639