If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of 'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social choice rule if, for any potential...

Recent theoretical research on principal-agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other's actions. Here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the...

The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can make a profit. The firms install short-run...

The authors provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinke d demand curve and Edgeworth cycle. In their alternating-move model, there are multiple Markov perfect equilibria of both the kinked deman d curve and Edgeworth cycle variety. In any Markov perfect equilibria , profit is...

We consider public-private partnerships, in which a public official selects a project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor. We derive optimal public accounting rules when the official's choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or because of pandering to...