The authors analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three-stage game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract execution. They assume that the information does not directly affect the agent's payoff (private values). Equilibrium exists...

The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with...

We model organization as the command-and-communication network of managers erected on top of technology (which is modelled as a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to deal with shocks that affect the plants that he oversees directly or indirectly. Organizational...

The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

February 6, 1999 <p> We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue...</p>