We report on an experiment that uses a simple dilemma game to compare two characterizations of reciprocal behavior, differing on whether it is necesary to account for intentions in order to accurately predict and measure reciprocal actions. The design of the experiment allows us to study both...

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our "hot" treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our "cold" treatment we follow the "strategy...

We investigate experimentally whether preferences over an outcome depend on what other possible outcomes of the situation under consideration are, i.e. whether choices are "menu dependent". In simple sequential games we analyze whether reactions to a certain benchmark oucome are influenced by...

This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms...

This paper presents data from experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries.