We study a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking,...

We provide a time consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows for self-control. This...

We develop and analyze a model of random choice and random expected utility. A decision problem is a finite set of lotteries that describe the feasible choices. A random choice rule associates with each decision problem a probability measure over choices. A random utility function is a...

We analyze candidate competition when some voters do not observe a candidate's policy choice. Voters have a personality preference when both candidates offer the same policy. In equilibrium, the candidate with a personality advantage may get elected with a partisan policy even though his...

This paper comments on "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal" by B. Douglas Beinheim (JEL D01, D87)

To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control (DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with DSC agents, equilibria exist but may be...