By using short-term direct finance firms of the highest credit quality exposethemselves to rollover risk in the public debt markets. Firms insure themselvesagainst this risk by securing backup lines of credit from banks that they mayuse should market liquidity dry up. In a first step, this paper...

This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equityis a real option of the …rm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type:the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares.The model provides a tractable approach for...

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

This paper deals with optimal financial contracts which simultaneously provide payincentives and impose constraints on managerial control.

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types...

Islamic banking in Malaysia, despite its recent start, has seen very rapid growth. This growth however has been uneven. While short-term trade financing has always been dominant and grown rapidly, Mudarabah financing by Islamic banks in Malaysia has reduced to insignificantly amounts. Yet,...

This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...

In this paper we apply the Principal/Agent theory in case of microcredit granted to the Moroccan micro-companies. The practice reveals us that a part of the receipted credits is diverted from its initial objective. Indeed, a situation of information asymmetries linked with adverse selection and...

This is a comment as discussant of a paper entitled “Choice between debt and equity contracts and asymmetrical information: Some empirical evidence" by Qazem Sadr and Zameer Iqbal, included in Iqbal, M. and Llewellyn, David T. (edit), Islamic Banking and Finance: New Perspectives on Profit...