In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence...

A player's strategy, for an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is subjectively rational if it is a best response to his individual beliefs regarding opponents' strategies. A vector of such strategies is a subjective equilibrium if the play induced by it is realization equivalent...

Consider a general finite-state stochastic process governed by an unknown objective probability distribution. Observing the system, a forecaster assigns subjective probabilities to future states. The resulting subjective forecast merges to the objective distribution if, with time, the forecasted...

In joint decision making, people with common goals and similar preferences often take drastically opposing positions. In some cases, arbitrarily small discrepancies in preferences result in arbitrarily large losses in utility for all participants. An understanding of the properties of...

Consider a probability distribution governing the evolution of a descrete-time stochastic process. Such a distribution may be represented as a convex combination of more elementary probability measures, with the interpretation of a two-stage Bayesian procedure. In the first stage, one of the...