We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find...

We study the problem of a seller who wants to maximize her revenue in situations where the outcome of the sale affects the nature of the future interaction between agents. We model those situations by assuming that an agent that does not acquire the object for sale incurs an externality that may...

We analyse the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licences. Moreover, we study how the auction format affects the incentives for explicit...

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which...

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a general social choice setting that allows for informationally interdependent valuations and for allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of...

We study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a prize. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids, and, moreover, bids may be capped. We show that regardless of the number of bidders, if bidders have linear or concave cost functions, then...

We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play...

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after...