The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a "Partnership Solution" to eliminate or at least mitigate these...

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a "Partnership Solution" to eliminate or at least mitigate these...

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in Ramp;D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a Partnership Solution to eliminate or at least mitigate these...

While reviewing "Game Theory and the Law" by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal Picker, this essay provides a self-contained, layman's introduction to modern noncooperative game theory

A modification of Chung and Fuchs’ (Mem. Amer. Math. Soc., 6 (1951), pp. 1-12) recurrence theorem for random walks leads to an analogous result for a different discrete parameter Markov process. This latter process is applicable to an analysis of price stabilization programs involving...

This paper describes the conceptual structure, properties, and solution approach of a computerized model of the international energy market. The model treats energy producers as players in a multistage, noncooperative game. The goal of each player (or cartel of players) is assumed to be...