The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more talented. But talent is private...

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against...

Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales, or evolve as sellers who care for sales in...

The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand) prescribes that in equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the number of competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is known as the "Bertrand Paradox". Many...

A vector of balanced weights infers an inequality that games with a nonempty core obey. This paper gives a generalization of the notion 'vector of balanced weights'. Herewith it provides necessary and su?cient conditions to determine whether a TU-game has a population monotonic allocation scheme...