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Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2004
". The efficiency loss due to fairness and strategy-proofness becomes measurable in monetary terms. Two interpretations of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452
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Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2004
". The efficiency loss due to fairness and strategy-proofness becomes measurable in monetary terms. Two interpretations of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645228
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In … this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance and non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). Our approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In … this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance and non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). Our approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Ehlers, Lars - 2013
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In … this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance and non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). Our approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208561
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Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006
This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771064
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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419350
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Ehlers, Lars - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2010
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. In … this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance and non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). Our approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008776032
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under … fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget …-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671538
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010
group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under … fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget …-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673