Groups of agents, such as participants in a collective pension fund, can decide to undertake a joint investment and to define, ex ante, a rule for the division of proceeds. The collective investment decision and the allocation rule together form a risk sharing scheme. Such a scheme defines a...

We work with a multi-period system where a finite number of agents need to share multiple monetary risks. We look for the solutions that are both Pareto efficient utility-wise and financially fair value-wise. A buffer enables the inter-temporal capital transfer. Expected utility is used to...

We consider the problem of finding an efficient and fair ex-ante rule for division of an uncertain monetary outcome among a finite number of von Neumann-Morgenstern agents. Efficiency is understood here, as usual, in the sense of Pareto efficiency subject to the feasibility constraint. Fairness...

Collective pension contracts can generate advantages for their participants by implementing forms of risk sharing. To ensure the continuity of a collective scheme, it has to be monitored whether the contracts offered to participants are financially fair in terms of their market value. When risk...