This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxees or input prices. In...

We derive the characteristics of firm-specific trade policies when industries consist of heterogeneous firms, and show how the informational requirements for policy design are thereby expanded. A consideration of these informational requirements indicates that governments will confront...

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time...

We analyze a model of strategic trade policies in the presence of international cross ownership of firms that are heterogeneous both in terms of costs and in terms of extent of foreign ownership. The equilibrium pattern of taxes and subsidies is characterized for any arbitrary cross ownership...

We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry which explicitely takes into account persistant production cost differences across upstream firms, such as one might observe in natural resource industries. The model allows us to highlight the respective roles of strategic...

In this paper the reaction of firms to the introduction of environmental charges in a given industry is analysed. Firms may decide either to relocate their plants abroad or to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology. The latter can be either developed by investing in R&D or obtained by...

This paper shows that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs, then the interplay between the Herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies. When the demand curve is concave,...

Le modele est constitue d'un tournoi entre deux employes d'une organisation hierarchique. Ces deux employes, initialement dans le meme poste, sont places en competition et celui qui realise le niveau de production le plus eleve obtient une promotion dans un poste, appele poste superieur. Les...

In this paper we show that a strict liability fine, established on the marginal damages caused by production act as a mean to discriminate between firms. More precisely, facing a potential risk, understood as a random negative externality, "ex ante" identical rival firms playing on a competitive...

This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition and locational choice that incorporates the notion of regional industrial systems. Firms play a non cooperative game where the strategy set of firms is given by a set of existing industrial districts. Each firm is distinguished by its...