We examine the noncooperative provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the European Union, where regional governments are Stackelberg leaders and the central government is a Stackelberg follower—a federation with decentralized leadership. The center...

We design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. This agency’s objective...

We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global...

We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the...