We design an international scheme to control global externalities in which autonomous regions choose their own emissions levels in anticipation of interregional resource transfers implemented by an international agency. This agency follows a proportional equity principle, which preserves the...

We examine numerous settings in which large strategic nations make environmental policies in the presence of international trade and form coalitions that aim to mitigate global or continental transnational pollution. We show that every nation has incentives to internalize all emission...

Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care or day care to their employees.Interpreting this as a strategic choice of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large and medium-size...

Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care or day care to their employees. Interpreting this as a strategic choice of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large and medium-size...

Just as in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non-wage benefits such as housing, medical care or day care to their employees. Interpreting this as a strategic choice of firms in an imperfect labor market, this paper examines unique survey data for 404 large and medium-size...

We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these...

This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations where selfish regional governments provide regional and federal public goods and the benevolent central government implements interregional earmarked and income transfers. Without residential mobility, unlimited...

This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision under asymmetric information, which are here ingredients of a policy-problem facing each member state (nation) of an economic federation with decentralized leadership. Each member state is assumed to have its own redistributive policy...

We examine the noncooperative provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the European Union, where regional governments are Stackelberg leaders and the central government is a Stackelberg follower—a federation with decentralized leadership. The center...